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A very Russian
COUP
In the wake of the Soviet drama, many observers 
concluded that the coup plotters were half-hearted from the 
start. Peter Feeney concludes that, on the contrary, they 
were determined and ruthless, but just too late.
or many observers the biggest surprise 
of the attempted 'coup' in the USSR 
was not that it happened but that it fell 
apart so rapidly. Tentative explanations 
have emphasised the sloppiness and stupidity of 
the coup leaders, and contrasted it with Yeltsin's 
near-faultless performance and the undoubted 
bravery of those youths in Moscow who 
demonstrated their willingness to risk all for 
their belief in Russia's, till now, faltering and 
uneven progress out of totalitarianism.
But stupidity and people-power could have been counter­
balanced at any time by a massive and pitiless show of 
force. The failure of the self-proclaimed Emergency Com­
mittee to ensure obedience via repression was not the result 
of humanitarian restraints. The committee was let down 
by its own security forces—the army, the KGB and the 
MVD (Internal Ministry)—and the coup leaders' hesita­
tion, dissension and ignominious end are all attributable 
to this failure.
The possibility of military interference in the reform 
process in the USSR haunted observers of perestroika from 
the beginning. Nevertheless the likelihood of independent 
military action against perestroika, a coup d'etat, pure and 
simple, was always slender. Excepting 1917, when the 
remaining original fragment of the old Tsarist Imperial 
Army was swept aside by its disaffected rank and file, there 
had been no tradition in Russia of direct military interven­
tion in politics. More importantly, the process of glasnost 
and perestroika were, from 1985, increasingly making In­
roads into the mili tary's integrative forces of discipline and 
solidarity. As perestroika proceeded it became more and 
more obvious that the Red Army, just as the rest of society, 
was divided within itself, and therefore lacked the institu­
tional solidarity to act alone
From late in 1990 a second scenario did look more 
plausible. This was the possibility of the military acting as
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the backbone to a combined conservative reassertion. On 
the face of it such a reassertion stood a fair chance of 
success. Top military leaders shared with like-minded 
creatures in the KGB and party apparatus a dislike of the 
changes wrought by perestroika, and a veritable horror of 
the changes to come. Their institutional power-bases were 
discredited but still largely unreformed and—at least on 
paper—still powerful. These conservatives had potential 
allies among traditionalist forces in sodety; blue collar 
workers fed up with constant and aimless sodal upheaval, 
servile peasants, military-industrialist employees fearful 
of their privileges, and so on. Such a coalition might sum­
mon up the legitimacy to reassure waverers in the army. 
The conservatives had already had their dress rehearsal in 
the crackdown of January 1991. Then, as on previous oc­
casions (Tbilisi and Lithuania), elements within the army 
proved themselves positively eager to crush dvilian resis­
tance.
The coup leaders believed that their appeal would extend 
beyond the dusty bulwarks of the old order they repre­
sented to reach a largish chunk of the public. Their assump­
tion was a sound one given the psychological exhaustion 
of the Soviet people. There have been no shortage of public 
opinion surveys that have charted a growing public yearn­
ing for order throughout the USSR. This is not to suggest 
that crowds were ever likely to throng the streets in support 
of the State of Emergency; rather the committee was gam­
bling on tarit acceptance. By immediately promising an 
end to shortages, ration coupons, rising prices, and the 
housing crisis the emergency committee demonstrated its 
sensitivity to the mounting anger in sodety over the in­
creasing difficulty of everyday living. The coup leadership 
was also counting on the unpopularity of Gorbachev and 
the inability of the democrats to work together in the past
The counter-argument to the committee's thinking is that 
the Soviet Union is no longer a suitable subject for 
totalitarian rule: the polity is better educated, less 
homogeneous and more aware of the importance of 
democratic freedoms. These traits are, however, not incom­
patible with the kind of 'wait and see' attitude that the coup 
conspirators gambled on. Even the intelligentsia who 
physically defended Yeltsin see him not as the national 
saviour but a man who, despite his serious faults, repre­
sents the only alternative to Gorbachev. (It is predsely 
because Yeltsin was for so long the only credible opposition 
to Gorbachev that groups of widely divergent views have 
been attracted to shelter under his umbrella. Now that he 
has become involved in the sordid business of actually 
governing we should expect his political support and 
popularity to diminish somewhat)
So, on the whole, the committee's gamble on the public 
mood was well founded (excluding some difficult 
republics such as Georgia and the Baltics). On the whole, 
active resistance was left to a very small number of 
politicians and intellectuals. It was the fact that these 
figures for several days were seen to be able to go about 
thtir business unmolested that overcame people's fears 
and brought them out onto the streets. The longer-term 
durability of the coalition of social forces which the junta 
hoped to champion was left unexplored.
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Along with people-power, plain old incompetence has also 
been suggested as an explanation for the coup's failure. Yet 
both charges actually have their roots in the failure of the 
coerdve organs that the coup leaders relied on. Stupidity 
is a difficult factor to quantify, but there is no amount of it 
that a good dose of ruthlessness cannot rectify.
The coup had actually been carefully planned to strike hand 
at centres of potential opposition, while still maintaining 
the pretence of legality. The willingness to descend into 
brutality was there, but the means were lacking. The junta 
was able to make some arrests, but only of lesser figures, 
while important persons—Sobchak, Popov, Kalugin and 
Yeltsin—were left alone. The resultant feebleness of the 
media crackdown, in the absence of reliable troops to 
enforce it, was particularly damaging. Had a curfew been 
imposed on Monday instead of Wednesday, and the media 
gagged, Russians would have been left isolated, unin­
formed and leaderless.
The failure of the coerdve organs might seem surprising 
since the coup leadership represented a core of conserva­
tives grouped within centralised, coerdve organisations: 
the party, KGB, military-industrial complex, and the Min­
istry of the Interior (MVD). The problem was that this 
hard-line consensus at the top simply did not exist at lows' 
levels of the hierarchies the conservatives led.
Until the time of the coup, officers and conscripts alike in 
the armed forces remained restricted to a monotonous diet 
of anti-perestroika articles in much of the military press. 
Despite this (or because of it?) the bifurcation in attitudes 
between senior and lower ranking officers was very 
marked, constituting a fault-line running contrary to in­
tegrative forces of disdpline and institutional solidarity I 
within the armed forces. Numerous surveys indicated that 
the majority of the officer corps at the grass roots level was 
aligned with dvilian reformers on the question of radical 
military reform including—despite the fact that 75% of to 
officer corps was, until recently, communist—the issue of 
depolitidsation. In addition, the army had quite literally J  
been under attack from perestroika for many years. By the | 
time of the coup its morale and prestige was at a near-criti­
cal low. There were powerful anti-military sentiments 
among the young, in many ways reminiscent of America, j 
during Vietnam; discipline was poor, with 250,000 
weapons lost' in 1989 alone; junior officers and NCOs 
shared the sodal burdens of the people, and many of theffl [ 
were recently returned from service in Eastern Europe to 
atrodous living conditions back home. The bulk of the 
army was therefore of highly questionable value to the 
junta. If pressed to do the work of internal policing many 
army units would have been rent asunder between the | 
conflicting loyalties of family, nationality, military honoin 
and basic prindples of democracy.
The forces of the Ministry of the Interior were potentiafly i 
the junta's most loyal troops. In Moscow, the MVD 
Dzerzhinsky Division (10,000 strong) remained dis- 
dplined, but reluctant to move on Yeltsin, The biggest 
surprise came from the KGB—the happy heme of 
centralism one might have thought—which turned outto 
be fragmented not just on generational lines but territorial
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ones as well. The KGB top leadership in Moscow sup­
ported the coup but officers lower down deliberately 
sabotaged their directives. The KGB had also begun to 
exhibit territorial sympathies. The Leningrad KGB 
dedared against the coup; KGB officers of the Lefortovo 
prison in Moscow referred to Kryuchkov and his crew as 
"senile reptiles". Ordinary police retained strong local 
sympathies in defiance of the committee's wishes {the core 
of Yeltsin's defence force was initially policemen). A great 
many army commanders remained neutral throughout 
Many may have been sympathetic to the conservative 
cause, but aware of the disunity among their troops were 
unwilling to risk active involvement
In the long run, obedience to the emergency committee 
could have been restored via extensive personnel sackings, 
but of course there was not time. In all arms of the security 
apparatus the chain of command tended to disintegrate at 
the middle and lower levels. The rot of perestroika had 
come to infect the armed forces and even, so it turned out, 
the KGB. Unfortunately for them the coup leadership only 
appears to have discovered these weaknesses after die 
coup began.
On the operational side the key to the success of the 
conservatives' gamble was that popular resistance should 
be minimal, and that any such resistance that did crop up 
be snuffed out fast by special troops. This would allow the 
bulk of the dtizen army to remain in the barracks with their 
conflicting loyalties (to uniform, family, republic and the 
constitution) safely untested. If neither of these two condi­
tions were met a large chunk of the army, with its doubtful 
loyalties, would become involved. The result could be dvil 
war.
The coup thus called for an accurate judgment of die 
public's mood and the utmost in ruthlessness from the 
coup leadership once committed. As I have argued the first 
condition would have held if the second had been applied. 
It was not This was not through lack of trying but simply 
because the troops who were counted on turned out to be 
unreliable Spedal troops—of the KGB or MVD—were 
always more likely to obey orders. They should have been 
turned to early, on the night of the 19th-20th, when there 
wasa chance they mightdo so. Regular troops should have 
been left right out of the action.
The coup leadership was obviously badly out of touch with 
the mood of the organisations they led. But there is a 
further explanation for their overestimation of the 
reliability of the security apparatus, and that is that pre­
viously elements of it had performed well. In January in 
Lithuania the Black Berets had spilt blood without waver­
ing. And in Moscow in March 50,000 men of all branches 
of the security forces had controlled pro-Yeltsin protests. 
In the former case, however, the operation had been small- 
scale; the latter operation had been conducted dearly 
within the bounds of the law.
ness was also present in Moscow last August within the 
emergency committee. Disturbingly, only a very few, and 
relatively young, army commanders—Kobets, Shaposh* 
nikov (Air Force) and Grachev (paratroops)—came out 
early against the coup; very many officers of the rank of 
colonel and above, judging from opinion polls taken prior 
to the coup, must have sympathised with the emergency 
committee. But, despite these attitudes, the bulk of the 
army, whatever its views, remained true to tradition, and 
sat out the coup on the sidelines. This neutrality may just 
have easily worked out to the junta's advantage, had they 
been more ruthless, more dedsive and more lucky.
The outcome of the coup has been a profound vindication 
of the process of perestroika. Although that process never 
envisaged the complete emasculation of the party that 
occurred following the coup, it did nurture the power of 
the democratic movement and undermined the effective­
ness of the forces of coerdon, breaking down their chain of 
command.
Perestroika is now unequivocally over, and the USSR looks 
primed for thorough-going change (assisted, one hopes, by 
the West). Nevertheless, the Red Army as a prominent 
Soviet institution is not about to disappear. Thanks to the 
committee's bungling, the forces of conservatism in Soviet 
sodety seem to have well and truly cooked their goose. By 
contrast, the prestige of the armed forces may have 
recovered somewhat thanks to its actions—or rather inac­
tions—during the coup. In fact, with the attack on the party 
which followed the rout of the conspirators, the army 
rem ains, alongside the infant democracies in the 
Republics, about the only credible pre-perestroika institu­
tion left. This isa problem because in its own way the Soviet 
military's sheer institutional weight is as much an obstade , 
to change as the conservatives or party were. Soviet sodety 
still devotes by peacetime standards an obscene amount of 
its resources to military productions: the Red Army even 
now maintains a standing complement of four million / 
troops, 21% of the best and brightest of the USSR's in- I 
dustrial workforce works in defence industries, and per­
haps as much as 15% of GNP (up to half the all-Union < 
budget) goes on defence spending.
The time is overdue to take on this resource-hungry , 
leviathan but this remains a complex task. The military's ] 
new post-coup leadership were promoted on the grounds 
of loyalty, which is not always the same as liberalism. The 
linked problems of military reform and a reduction in the 
defence budget together represent a major obstade to fur­
ther reform. The end of the centralised Union may assist 
the break-up and destruction, piecemeal, of this ungainly I 
colossus. Then again, if the break-up is accompanied by 
tension, defence spending is likely to remain high. Despite t 
the involvement of so many of the top brass in the August f 
coup, much of what the Red Army has come to stand for | 
during perestroika may bo preserved in a post-commimisf I 
environment for some time to come.
At Tiananmen in 1989, conservative communists were con­
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